One of the most prominent features of U.S. unionism is the key role played by seniority. However, in cross-sectional data, the positive association between seniority and earnings is typically much stronger for nonunion workers than for union workers. This finding has puzzled previous researchers, since it seems inconsistent with the generalization that seniority is more important in the union sector than in the nonunion sector.
I. Introduction
A prominent feature of U.S. unionism is the key role played by seniority. As early as the 1920's and 1930's, replacing foreman's discretion with a seniority-based reward structure was an important focus of the emerging union movement.' Modern theories of union behavior emphasize the strength of senior workers' influence on union objectives (Farber, 1978; Blair and Crawford, 1984; Freeman and )ledoff, 1984; Farber, 1986) . Recent evidence indicates that seniority is indeed substantially more important in both layoffs and promotions under collective bargaining than in its absence Medoff, 1984, 1985) . The major exception to the generalization that seniority is more important in the union sector than in the nonunion sector is the finding, replicated by a number of researchers using different data sets, that the slope of the seniority-earnings profile in a cross-section is steeper for nonunion workers than for union workers.2
In this study, we challenge the finding that the returns to seniority are greater among nonunion workers than among union workers. Elsewhere (Abraham and Farber, 1987) , we argue that standard cross-section estimates of the returns to seniority are biased upwards, and we provide evidence that this bias is quite important for nonunion workers.
Here, we argue that this bias is larger for nonunion workers than for union workers and that the true returns to seniority are larger among union workers than among nonunion workers. In the next section we present a discussion of the sources of bias 1. Slichter (1941) offers an insightful discussion of union attitudes towards seniority rules. See also Gersuny (1981) .
2. Representative studies include Leigh (1978) , Borjas (1979) , and Pfeffer and Ross (1980) , all using the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men; using the Quality of Employment Survey; Polachek (1983) using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics; and Mellow (1983) using the May 1979 Current Population Survey. Many of these studies are summarized in Lewis (1986) in the standard estimates of the return to seniority, and we discuss why the bias is expected to be larger for nonunion workers in section III.
In section IV we develop two alternative approaches to deriving consistent estimates of the return to seniority. Both approaches depend on a measure of completed job duration that we construct using data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) based on the estimation of separate Weibull proportional hazards models for the union and nonunion sectors. The construction of these job duration measures is described in Section V of the paper. Section VI contains the paper's central results regarding the estimation of separate earnings functions for union and nonunion males in blue-collar jobs from the PSID.
The results are in line with our expectations. In standard cross section earnings equations fit for samples of blue collar workers, the estimated return to seniority is larger for the nonunion group than for the union group. However, once the upward bias in these standard estimates is taken into account, we find that the returns to seniority are larger for union blue collar workers than for nonunion blue collar workers.
II. Bias in Cross-Section Earnings Functions
We turn now to a simple model of the sources of bias in cross-section estimates of the return to seniority. Such bias may arise from unmeasured individual differences in earnings and/or from unmeasured job/match differences in earnings. Individual heterogeneity will cause an upward bias in the estimated return to seniority if more able individuals both earn higher wages and stay longer on their jobs. Job/match heterogeneity will cause an upward bias if workers on good jobs or in good matches both earn more and stay longer on their jobs. The model illustrates the contribution of three factors to the magnitude of the upward bias in the estimated return to seniority. 3 These factors are 1) the degree to which ability is rewarded with higher pay, 2) the variance in ability in the sample population, and 3) the variance in the job/match component in earnings.
Suppose that the earnings of a particular worker on a particular job at a particular point in time can be written:
(1) mW. 
lnw.
where . is the total return to seniority and + u is the total return to pre-job experience. The net return to seniority is appropriately defined as the excess of growth in earnings on a given job over and above the total returns to general labor market experience, or -+ c).
In practice, earnings functions are usually estimated using crosssection data where neither A nor are observable. The earnings function as ordinarily implemented in a cross-section can be rewritten as: 3. This model is a generalization of the model presented in Abraham and Farber (1987) 4. See and Topel (1985) and Abraham and Farber (1987) . The parameter 2. will be positive to the extent that more able workers are on longer duration jobs, and the parameter will be positive to the extent that workers in "good" jobs or good matches are on longer duration jobs. The random component, E.., captures the variation in completed job duration that cannot be linked to variation in worker quality or to variation in the earnings advantage associated with job/match quality.5
Substituting from equation (2), 
1J
If each year of any given job is equally likely to be represented in a cross-section of observations, then on average the observed seniority on the job will be halfway through the job. More formally and that
where bEXp is the coefficient obtained from a regression of EXP on S (which is expected to be positive), DET1 is the determinant of the X'X matrix containing cross-products of seniority and experience, and the other terms are as previously defined. Thus, the estimated total return to seniority is biased upwards and the estimated total return to experience is correspondingly biased downwards. Both the upward bias in the estimated total return to seniority and the downward bias in the estimated total return to experience contribute to an upward bias in the estimated net return to seniority, b1 -
b2.
The formal model, and in particular equations (9) and (10) Lewis, 1986 ) using data on individuals have established that skill differentials and educational d.ifferentials in wages are lower among unionized workers than among nonunion workers. While these studies pertain only indirectly to the rewards to unobservable differences in ability, they suggest strongly that the rewards () associated with these differences are lower among union workers. To the extent that this is true, the bias in estimated 8 seniority coefficients will be less for samples of union workers.
Next, it is plausible that there is less heterogeneity in ability among union workers than among nonunion workers. Abowd and Farber (1982) and develop and test a queuing model of union status determination. They hypothesize that "more skilled workers would be less likely to desire a union job while union employers would be more likely to want to hire more skilled workers" (Abowd and Farber, 1982, p. 367) , and their empirical findings are generally supportive of the model. To the extent that unobserved ability is an important factor in both worker selection and employer selection, the dispersion of ability among union workers will be lower than the dispersion of ability among nonunion workers. Assuming that more able workers are also more stable, lower dispersion in ability (var(A1)) for union workers means less upward bias in estimated seniority coefficients for samples of union workers.
Finally, there is reason to suspect that the variation in the job/match component of earnings will be lower across union jobs than across nonunion jobs. Institutional labor economists have long recognized that unions strive to standardize rates across establishments, at least within broad sectors (see Slichter, Healy and Livernash (1960) ). Freeman (1982) offers evidence that dispersion in average wages across union establishments in an industry does tend to be lower than the dispersion in wages across nonunion establishments in the same industry. In addition, the same forces limiting employers' power to reward higher ability workers would also limit their power to pay higher wages to workers who are especially well suited to a particular job, thereby reducing the importance of match-specific (as opposed to job-specific)
effects. To the extent that the variation in that part of the job/match component of earnings not systematically related to experience (var(..)) is lower across union jobs than across nonunion jobs, this too will contribute to lower bias in the estimated return to seniority in cross-section earnings 9 equations fit for samples of union workers.
Further evidence concordant with the above hypotheses is provided by the various studies which conclude that the dispersion of wages is lower in the union sector than in the nonunion sector, even after controlling for the influence of observable individual characteristics.6
These arguments for why we might expect less bias in the estimated return to seniority for union workers than for nonunion workers assume that other things are equal across the two sectors. We have no a iori reason to expect that var(EXP), or the ratio of var(EXP) to DET1 should differ systematically between the union and the nonunion sectors. We cannot simply compute the relative biases in the estimated net returns to seniority in union and nonunion earnings functions using equations (9) and (10) since much of the information on unobservables that would be needed is unavailable.
However, we have developed methods for computing corrected estimates of the seniority coefficients in cross-section earnings equations.
IV. Corrected Cross-section Estimates of the Return to Seniority
One approach to correcting the equation (4) estimates of the returns to seniority and to experience is to find an appropriate instrument for the seniority variable. Equation (8) 6. These studies include Hyclak (1979) , Freeman (1980) and Hirsch (1982) . 10 The preceding assumes that the expected value of current seniority in a cross-section is indeed just equal to half completed job duration. This assumption is stronger than necessary and may not be precisely correct. For example, in a growing population, there will likely be more people near the start of their jobs than near the end. More generally, using the residual from the regression of seniority on completed job duration as an instrument for seniority yields consistent estimates of and 2 + . By construction, this residual is uncorrelated with completed duration and correlated with 7
seniority.
An appealing alternative approach to correcting the bias in the estimated seniority coefficient in a cross-section earnings equation is to control explicitly for the completed length of the job. We term this the "augmented OLS" approach. The seniority coefficient in equation (4) (12) mW.. =bS.. +bEXP.. +bD.. +..
The seniority coefficient in equation (12), b,, is an unbiased estimator of
The experience coefficient has expectation:
where hEX? D j5 the coefficient obtained from a regression of EXP on D (which 7. For more details in the context of a simpler model, see Abraham and Farber (1987) . Altonji and Shakotko (1987) present a related instrumental variables approach to estimating the returns to seniority. 11 expected to be positive), DET2 equals the determinant of the 2x2 matrix containing cross-products of EXP and D, and the other terms are as previously defined. So long as workers with more pre-job experience tend to stay longer in their positions, b2 is a downward biased estimate of + . This, in turn, implies that b1 b2 is an upward biased estimate of the net return to seniority.8 The augmented OLS procedure has the advantage that it permits direct examination of the relationship between completed job duration and earnings, both on average and over the course of the job.
Using the identity that links total experience with pre-job experience and seniority (EX?..t = EXP.. + S..t) and ignoring second order terms, valid inferences regarding the net return to seniority can be drawn from an earnings function specification that includes either pre-job experience or total experience along with seniority. Where pre-job experience is used, the net return to seniority ( -+)) is calculated as the difference between the coefficient on seniority and the coefficient on pre-job experience. Where total experience is used, the net return to seniority is simply the coefficient on seniority. To facilitate discussion regarding the net return to seniority, we proceed from here using total experience.9
In the empirical analysis that follows, we develop a measure of completed job duration using longitudinal data and use this measure in the two 8. In the samples we examine, the instrumental variables procedure and the alternative procedure of adding completed job duration to the earnings equation yield almost identical estimates of the net return to seniority. This implies that, in these samples, the bias in the estimated total return to experience and the resulting bias in the estimated net return to seniority are quite small. See Section VI.
9. For the instrumental variables estimator, this requires the minor modification that total experience (and its square, if included) must be instrumented for along with seniority. The natural additional instruments are pre-job experience (and its square). In a model without squared terms, the IV estimator of the specification using pre-job experience and the IV estimator using total experience with pre-job experience as an additional instrument yield identical estimates of the underlying parameters. 12 ways just described to estimate "corrected" earnings functions for samples of union and nonunion blue collar workers.
V.
The first step in implementing the analysis just described is to derive a measure of completed job duration. Clearly, a data set suitable for this task must follow individual workers over time so that one can observe how long the jobs they hold ultimately last. The data set should also have information on the individual workers' characteristics, including their union status, and their wages/earnings. The ?Iichigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) satisfies these requirements and is used in the empirical analysis.
Unfortunately, even in a long panel like the PSID, there are many jobs which do not end by the date at which the individual is last observed. Some procedure must be used to impute completed durations to these jobs.
We take the approach of estimating a parametric model of job duration that accounts for the censoring of duration in those jobs for which the end is not observed. This model is then used to compute an estimate of the expected completed job duration conditiona on the job lasting, at least as long as the last observed seniority level. In the estimation of the earnings function, this estimate is used as the measure of completed job duration for the censored spells. The actual completed job duration is used for jobs for which the end is observed. This procedure has the advantage of using all available information on job duration.
A. The Jobs Sample
All of the subsequent analysis is performed using data for male 10 househola heads agea 18 to 60 who participated in the PSID.
We used only 10. Unfortunately, the design of the PSID precludes meaningful examination 13 observations from the random national sample portion of the PSID (the so- criteria were household heads, information was available on number of years they had held their current job, number of years they had worked prior to taking the current job, years of education, race, marital status, disability status, occupation, industry, region and earnings.14 of females for the purposes of this study. This is because complete information is available only for household heads, and, where households contain both male and female adults, the male is assumed to be the head by default. 11. There were not enough white collar unionized workers to permit a meaningful analysis of white collar workers.
12. In some years unionization refers to union membership, and in other years to coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. Where both were available, collective bargaining agreement coverage was used.
13. In 371 jobs workers were coded nonunion in some years and union in others. If 1) at least two thirds of the observed years on one of these jobs were coded nonunion, 2) there were no runs of three or more years coded union, and 3) the first and last years observed on the job were coded nonunion, then the entire job was considered a nonunion job and was included in the nonunion sample. An analogous decision rule lead to the assignment of some mixed jobs to the union sample. A total of 149 jobs could not be assigned to either group and were deleted altogether.
14.
Nore details on the data file used in the analysis, and in particular on the construction of the seniority variable, can be found in Abraham and Farber (1987) . We are grateful to Joe Altonji for making his data extract from the PSID available to us. 14 There are 767 jobs held by 551 individuals represented in the union blue collar sample and 1417 jobs held by 831 individuals represented in the noflUfliOfl blue collar sample. Our concern at this point is with ascertaining how long each of these jobs ultimately lasted.
Various characteristics of the jobs in each of the two samples are reported in Table 1 . Variables that can change over time in an unpredictable fashion (e.g., marital status, occupation) are assumed constant and measured at the first point the job is observed in the sample. The last observed seniority on a job is always considered to be the seniority at the last date the person is observed with an employer, whether or not the individual is 15 still in a blue collar position at that date.
In the union blue collar sample, we observe the actual completed duration for 327 of 767 jobs, and in the nonunion blue collar sample, for 775 of 1417 jobs. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the completed jobs are relatively short: 71 percent of the completed jobs in the union blue collar sample and 85 percent of those in the nonunion blue collar sample lasted no more than three years. However, in both samples, there are a sizable number of completed jobs lasting 3 to 10 years and over 10 years. Longer jobs are more common among the still-in-progress jobs: 28 percent of the incomplete jobs in the union blue collar sample and 22 percent of the incomplete jobs in the nonunion blue collar sample had lasted more than 10 years as of the last date they were observed.
15. For example, if an individual 1) was observed on a single job for ten years running 2) reported being a blue collar worker for the first five years and a professional employee for the next five years; and 3) reported having 13 years seniority in the last observed year, then the job would appear in our sample with a last observed seniority of 13 years. aExcept for tenure and years of previous experience, all variables are reported as of the first year the job was observed. Previous experience was computed as the difference between reported experience in the first year the job was observed and seniority at that point.
B. SpecifiCapJ24i
In order to use completed job duration as an earnings equation control variable, we need a method of determining the expected completed duration of the incomplete jobs. We specify and estimate a parametric model of completed job duration for each sector, and. then we use the estimated parameters to predict the expected completed length of jobs still in progress as of the last date we observe them.
The proportional hazard Weibull specification serves as the basis of the estimation reported here. In that specification, the probability that a job has completed duration (D) greater than or equal to T is (14) Pr(D T) = exp [xTU] where is a positive parameter. The proportional hazard assumption is that the baseline hazard is -z.
(15) x=e where Z is a vector of observable individual characteristics hypothesized to affect job duration and ' is a vector of parameters. The separation hazard associated with this distribution is:
If the parameters of a Weibull duration model are estimated, there is some ambiguity in the interpretation of the estimate of u. The obvious interpretation is that the estimated value of indicates "true" duration
dependence. An alternative interpretation is that the estimate of is biased downward by unmeasured heterogeneity across individuals, jobs and/or matches.
For the purposes of this study, we are not interested in distinguishing between true and spurious duration dependence. We are simply interested in estimating a parametric model of completed job duration that is flexible enough to make allowance for both true duration dependence and unmeasured heterogeneity in hazards. While we could specify a particular distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard along with the Weibull form of duration dependence, it is well known that there are problems with robustness of the estimates of heterogeneity and duration dependence with regard to changes in the assumed distributions in models of this sort. 16 We take the approach of estimating a simple Veibull model of completed job duration without any explicit representation for unmeasured heterogeneity.
The contribution to the likelihood function made by a completed job is the Probability-density that the job lasted exactly Sf years given that the job lasted at least S0 years.'7 Given a Weibull distribution for duration, this is (17) Pr(D=SfID>S0) = Similarly, the contribution to the likelihood function made by a job with a censored duration is the probability that the job lasted more_than Sf years given that the job lasted at least S0 years. This is (18) Pr(D SfID>50) = expt->(S-s)].
The log-likeljho function is formed from these probabilities as 16. See Lancaster (1979) for a parametric approach to the problem of estimating unmeasured heterogeneity in a WeibulJ. model of unemployment duration. Heckman and Singer (1984) present a semi-parametric approach to estimating duration models with unmeasured heterogeneity.
17. It is important to condition on the length of the job as of the date it is first observed because the sampling scheme is such that jobs will not be observed unless they last long enough to make it to the start of the sample period.
18. Note that this specification of the likelihood function assumes that unmeasured factors affecting completed job durations are independent across spells. A more complete specification would recognize that we observe some people on more than one job and allow explicitly for individual heterogeneity in job changing propensity. Given the nonlinear nature of the model, we saw 17 C. Estimation of the Job Duration Model Column 1 and column 2 of Table 2 contain estimates of the Weibull job duration model estimated over the subsamples of 767 union blue collar jobs and 1417 nonunion blue collar jobs, respectively. These estimates were derived by maximizing the likelihood function defined above with respect to the parameters and In interpreting the estimates of the determinants of the baseline hazard (k), recall that the hazard rate was specified such that Thus, an increase in a variable with a positive coefficient reduces x and increases the expected duration of the job. In both models the hypothesis that the all of the coefficients () in the baseline hazard (x) with the exception of the constant are zero can be rejected at any reasonable level of significance.2° Thus, the variables included in the model have significant explanatory power for job duration.
The two sets of estimates are generally similar. In both the union and the nonunion sample, years of experience prior to taking a job has a positive effect on the completed duration of the job. Married workers' jobs tend to last longer than those of otherwise similar workers. Education raises predicted job duration for the nonunion sample, but has no statistically significant effect on job duration for the union sample. Being a foreman or craft worker has a stronger effect on the duration of union jobs than on the duration of nonunion jobs.
no obvious appropriate and tractable way to do this. 19. The algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) was used to find the maximum.
20. The likeihood ratio statistic is 81.2 for the union model. This is distributed as x with 21 degrees of freedom. The likelih9od ratio statistic is 104.8 for the nonunion model. This is distributed as x with 22 degrees of freedom. We used the parameter estimates from the appropriate column of Table 2 to predict the expected completed job duration of each of the incomplete jobs in the two san'iples.21 This expectation is computed conditionally on the job lasting longer than the last observed seniority (Sf years). Note that the job duration model we have estimated is based on data for the pre-retirement period. It will capture the net effects of quit and layoff processes on job duration, but will not capture the effect of the competing retirement process which comes into play for older workers. If we predicted job durations without taking retirement into account, some would be implausibly long. We therefore assume that all jobs that are in progress when the worker reaches age 65 end at that point.
For an individual/job match with observable characteristics Z that has lasted Sf years as of the last date we observe it, the conditional expected All predictions use the parameter estimates contained in Table 2 . The conditional expectation of the square of completed job duration was computed in a similar manner.
21. Recall that the actual completed job duration is used for the completed jobs. 
VI. Earnings Function Estimates
Having derived an estimate of completed job duration we turn now to the question of the relative magnitude of the net returns to seniority in union and nonunion jobs.
Our starting point is to fit standard earnings functions of the form The first columns of tables 3a and 3b contain estimates of 20 selected parameters of standard earnings functions.22 Each equation also includes controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation, industry, region, and time. These estimates imply that the returns to seniority are larger for the nonunion blue collar sample than for the union blue collar sample. Among union workers, each additional year of seniority is associated with roughly a 1.0 percent increment to earnings; among nonunion workers, each additional year of seniority is associated with earnings that are 1.4 percent higher. The difference between the two estimated seniority coefficients is significant at better than the 0.01 level.
The instrumental variables estimates in the tables' second columns tell a very different story. In these equations, the residual from the regression of seniority on completed job duration is used as an instrument for seniority, and pre-job experience and its square are used as instruments for total experience and its square.23 The estimated return to seniority for the union sample falls only slightly, from 1.0 percent per year to just over 0.7 percent per year. The decline in the estimated return to seniority is much larger for the nonunion sample, a drop of more than a full percentage point from 1.4 percent to 0.3 percent per year, and the corrected estimate is not significantly different from zero. In contrast to the standard equations, these equations imply that the return to seniority for union blue collar 22. The stadard erors presented are the "simp1e standrd errors computed from a (X'X) for the OLS models and from (Z'X) for the IV models. These standard errors are not strictly appropriate for the estimation here because they do not account for the fact that the measure of completed job duration is predicted for the observations on censored jobs. Standard errors that are corrected both for this fact and for general heteroskedasticity were computed for a number of specifications. These were uniformly very close to the "simple" standard errors.
23. in the regression of seniority on completed job duration fit for the union sample, the constant term is -1.990 (standard error 0.206) and the job duration coefficient is 0.500 (0.008). In the nonunion equation, the constant term is -1.313 (0.097) and the job duration coefficient is 0.550 (0.005). aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation, industry, region, and time. E(completed job duration) is computed using the relevant estimates from Table 2 . The IV estimates use 1) the residual from the regression of seniority on completed job duration, 2) pre-job experience, and 3) the square of pre-job experience as instruments for seniority, experience, and the square of experience. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size = 3084. aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation, industry, region, and time. E(completed job duration) is computed using the relevant estimates from Table 2 . The IV estimates use 1) the residual from the regression of seniority on completed job duration, 2) pre-job experience, and 3) the square of pre-job experience as instruments for seniority, experience, and the square of experience. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size = 3554. 21 workers is larger than the return for nonunion blue collar workers, a difference that is significant at better than the 0.01 level.
As discussed earlier, an alternative estimate of the net return to seniority can be obtained by adding completed job duration to the standard earnings function. This is done in the column (3) models of tables 3a and 3b.
The returns to seniority estimated using this alternative approach are virtually identical to those obtained using the IV approach. While the theoretical discussion in Section II implied that the augmented OLS estimates of the return to seniority reported in column (3) may be upward biased, the close correspondence between the IV and augmented OLS estimates indicates that any such bias is small.24
These findings are in accord with some scattered earlier results.
Mincer (1983) finds that controlling for prior nobility reduces the estimated return to seniority for nonunion workers, but not for union workers. Altonji and Shakotko (1987) use an instrumental variables approach to dealing with the bias in estimated returns to seniority. While union/nonunion differences are not a central focus of their study, they do report that their correction procedure reduces the estimated return to seniority more dramatically for nonunion workers than for union workers.
The other interesting implication of the column (3) estimates is that, in both samples, those on long jobs earn substantially and significantly more than those on short jobs. Among union blue collar workers, someone on a job that will end up lasting twenty years earns 9.0 percent more in each year on the job than someone on a job that will end up lasting only five years. Among nonunion blue collar workers, someone on a twenty year job earns approximately 24. In fact, in the nonunion sample, the augmented OLS estimate is slightly, though not significantly, smaller than the IV estimate.
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18 percent more in each year on the job than someone on a five year job.
In the column (4) models, we allow the effects of completed job duration to vary with current seniority. The results confirm that those on long jobs earn more at all points on the job, although the effect seems to be strongest at the start of the job and somewhat weaker later on.
The column (4) results contradict one possible alternative interpretation of our central finding that, when completed job duration is introduced into the earnings equation, it takes on a positive coefficient and the estimated return to seniority falls. Specifically, it might be argued that the returns to seniority are higher on long jobs than on short jobs and that, because we do not allow for this possibility, completed job duration enters with a positive coefficient and soaks up some of what are in fact returns to seniority. If this interpretation were correct, when we allowed the effects of completed job duration to vary with current seniority, we should find that eventual completed job duration is only weakly associated with earnings among workers with lower levels of seniority, and more strongly associated with earnings among workers with higher levels of seniority. In fact, the opposite appears to be true.
Probably the most important question to be raised about the preceding analysis is whether we have done a sufficiently good job of measuring completed job duration. Using expected completed job duration in place of actual completed job duration does not cause inconsistency in the earnings equation parameter estimates, provided the correct job duration model has been used in computing completed job duration. However, if the job duration model itself is misspecified and this leads to random errors in the expected completed job duration variable, both the instrumental variables estimate and 23 the augmented OLS estimate of the return to seniority are biased upwards.25
In the present context, if we have done a less good job of predicting expected completed job duration for the union blue collar sample than for the nonunion blue collar sample, this could at least in part account for the higher estimated return to seniority for union workers than for nonunion workers in the IV and augmented OLS equations.
In light of this concern, we have made an effort to assess the method used to compute completed job durations for the censored jobs. Since our measure of completed job duration for censored jobs is really a nonlinear transformation of the sorts of variables already included in the earnings function plus the last observed value of seniority, an obvious question is whether our measure completed job duration contains information beyond that contained in last observed seniority itself. The models in the first three columns of tables 4a and 4b indicate that, for both the union and the nonunion samples, this question can be answered "yes". For comparison, column (1) repeats the augmented OLS euatjon that includes completed job duration and its square. In column (2), last observed seniority and its square replace completed job duration. The column (3) models include both completed job duration and last observed seniority. In both samples, comparison of column (2) and column (3) reveals that the inclusion of completed job duration and 25. Taking the instrumental variables approach, the instrument for seniority is constructed as the residual from the regression of seniority on expected completed job duration. If there are random errors in the expected completed job duration variable, its coefficient in this regression will be biased downward. This means that the constructed residual will be positively correlated with actual completed job duration and thence with omitted individual or job/match quality. Using this residual as an instrument for seniority in the earnings equation yields an upward biased estimate of the return to seniority. In the augmented OLS earnings equation, random errors in the expected completed job duration variable cause the job duration coefficient to be biased towards zero and the estimated net return to seniority to be biased upwards. aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation, industry, region, and year. E(completed job duration) is computed using the estimates in column (1) of table 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size=3084. aAll models also include controls for education, race, marital status, disability, occupation, industry, region, and year. E(completed job duration) is computed using the estimates in column (2) of table 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Sample size=3554.
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its square adds significantly to the model's explanatory power at the 0.05 level or better, even after controlling for last observed seniority. The major difference between the two samples is that last observed seniority adds significantly to the explanatory power of the union model even after completed job duration has been controlled for, whereas it does not add significantly to the explanatory power of the nonunion model.26
We have no explanation for why last observed seniority should have an independent association with earnings in the union sector.
Another obvious question concerning our completed job duration variable is whether the relationship between completed job duration and earnings differs between the observations that come from jobs where actual completed durations are observed and from jobs where completed durations are predicted.
To answer this question, we reestirnated the augmented OLS earnings functions with two additional variables: the interaction between completed job duration with a dummy variable that equals one if the job duration is uncensored and equals zero otherwise, and the interaction of the square of completed job duration with the same dummy variable. These estimates are contained in column (4) of tables 4a and 4b. In the union sample, these interaction terms add significantly to the explanatory power of the model; in the nonunion 26. This is verified by F-tests of the general specification in column (3) against the restricted specifications in column (1) and column (2). The test statistics for the hypothesis that completed job duration and its square have zero coefficients are 3.27 for union blue collar workers and 12.1 for nonunion blue collar workers. The test statistics for the hypothesis that last observed seniority and its square have zero coefficients are 6.22 for union blue collar workers and 0.295 for nonunion blue collar workers. All the test statistics are distributed as F with 2 and approximately 3000 degrees of freedom. The critical values of this distribution are 3.00 at the 5 percent level and 4.61 at the 1 percent level. 25 sample, they do not. 27 It is clear that our measure of completed job duration captures important variation in worker/job/match quality in both sectors. However, our procedures do seem to be somewhat more satisfactory for the nonunion sector than for the union sector. With regard to the estimated returns to seniority, the estimates in tables 4a and 4b imply roughly equal returns for union and nonunion workers, but these estimates are based on specifications with no obvious structural interpretation.
In conclusion, our corrected estimates (in tables 3a and 3b) have the clear implication that the return to seniority in the union sector is larger than the return to seniority in the nonunion sector. This finding is conditional on our measures of union and nonunion job durations, and we do find some evidence that our union job duration measure is imperfect. However, even our explorations using less restrictive models (in tables 4a and 4b) always yield estimated seniority coefficients in the union sector that are at least as large as the estimated nonunion seniority coefficients. Thus, we reject the standard finding that the return to seniority is smaller in the union sector than in the nonunion sector.
27. The test statistics are 6.22 for the union sample and 2.95 for the nonunion sample, both distributed as F with 2 and just over 3000 degrees of freedom. The critical values of this distribution are 3.00 at the 5 percent level and 4.61 at the 1 percent level.
